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Abstract
This article summarizes a recently completed study, funded by the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and conducted by the Urban
Institute, of discrimination against black and Hispanic homebuyers when they
visit mortgage lending institutions in two major metropolitan markets to make
pre-application inquiries. It represents the first application of paired testing to rig-
orously measure discrimination in the mortgage lending process. The paired tests
disclosed significant levels of adverse treatment on the basis of race and ethnicity,
with African Americans and Hispanics receiving less information and assistance
than comparable whites, even at this very early stage in the application process.
Other Things Being Equal: A Paired Testing Study of
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending
Margery Austin Turner, Erin Godfrey, Stephen L. Ross, and Robin R. Smith
3/7/2003
When first-time homebuyers begin shopping for a house, they need to learn
about mortgages for which they can qualify and about house prices they can afford.
This information can be obtained from a variety of sources, including mortgage lending
institutions, real estate agents, and mortgage brokers.  But if potential homebuyers
cannot obtain full and fair access to information about mortgage financing, they may give
up on their pursuit of homeownership, their housing search may be restricted, or they
may be unable to negotiate the most favorable loan terms.  Thus, pre-application
inquiries about mortgage financing options represent a critical phase in the homebuying
process.
This article summarizes a recently completed study, funded by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and conducted by the Urban
Institute, of discrimination against black and Hispanic homebuyers when they visit
mortgage lending institutions in two major metropolitan markets to make pre-application
inquiries.  It represents the first application of paired testing to rigorously measure
discrimination in the mortgage lending process.  The paired tests disclosed significant
levels of adverse treatment on the basis of race and ethnicity, with African Americans
and Hispanics receiving less information and assistance than comparable whites, even
at this very early stage in the application process.
Discrimination in the Mortgage Lending Process
More than three decades after the passage of the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act), African American and Hispanic homebuyers still do not enjoy
equal access to home ownership.  Widespread evidence indicates that minority
homebuyers are less likely than whites to obtain mortgage loans and, if they are
successful, receive less favorable loan amounts and terms.  However, considerable
disagreement persists about the extent to which discrimination is the cause of these
unequal outcomes, or whether they result primarily from unequal qualifications and
creditworthiness.1  A recent review of existing social science evidence concluded that
minority homebuyers in the United States do face discrimination from mortgage lending
                                                
1 See, for example, Munnell et al (1986), Ross and Yinger (2002), Goering and Wienk (1996), Carr
and Megbolugbe (1993); Ladd (1998); Yezer (1995).
institutions.2  But serious gaps remain in what we know and more rigorous information is
needed about the forms it takes and the stages at which it occurs in order to refine and
target enforcement strategies, to enable lending institutions to monitor their own
performance, and to design remedies to reduce discrimination in home mortgage
lending.
Paired testing provides a uniquely powerful tool for investigating both the
incidence and the forms of adverse treatment based on race or ethnicity.  In a paired
test, two individuals―one white and one minority―pose as homebuyers and inquire
about the availability and terms for home mortgage loans.3  Because the two members of
a tester team present themselves as equally qualified borrowers in every respect except
their race or ethnicity, systematic differences in the treatment they receive provide direct
evidence of disparate treatment.4
The paired testing methodology has been used widely to detect and measure
adverse treatment by rental and sales agents, but only a few, relatively small-scale
investigative studies―primarily by the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA)―have
been applied to mortgage lending.  During the early 1990s, NFHA conducted tests in
seven cities (Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Oakland, and Richmond).
Testers posed as first-time homebuyers and refinancers inquiring about financing terms
and conditions at the pre-application stage.  A reanalysis of these testing data by the
Urban Institute concluded that differential treatment occurred at significant levels in at
least some cities.  Minorities were less likely to receive information about loan products,
received less time and information from loan officers, and were quoted higher interest
rates in most of the cities where tests were conducted.
Paired Testing Methodology
Building upon the experience and findings of previous testing efforts, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) contracted with the Urban
Institute to further refine and apply methods for conducting paired testing at the pre-
                                                
2 Turner and Skidmore (1999).
3 For more information on paired testing and its role in both measurement and enforcement, see
Fix and Turner (1999).
4 It is important to note that discrimination in mortgage lending may involve either disparate
treatment (unequal treatment of equals) or disparate impact (policies that, though equally applied,
systematically disadvantage minorities).  The paired testing methodology captures disparate treatment, but
not disparate impact discrimination.  However, it is possible that disparate treatment discrimination at the
pre-application stage might cause minority borrowers to apply for different loan amounts or products,
thereby contributing to a pattern of disparate treatment.
application stage of the mortgage lending process.5  Because of the complexity of the
mortgage application process and the challenges it presents for paired testing, we
divided this effort into two basic stages―a pre-test stage and a pilot stage.
The pre-test stage was used to experiment with a fairly wide variety of paired
testing scenarios, and to assess the feasibility of testing several different sources of
mortgage financing information. A total of 78 tests were conducted in two
markets―Orange County, California and New Orleans, Louisiana – targeting six
different information sources, reflecting the range of possible sources of mortgage
information used by homebuyers, including conventional mortgage lenders, sub-prime
mortgage lenders, mortgage brokers, real estate agents, new home sales offices, and
mobile home dealers.  The pre-tests were also used to experiment with different testing
scenarios.  Some testers indicated that they already had a particular house in mind while
others were trying to find out how much they could potentially afford.  Some testers
posed as well-qualified borrowers, while others were assigned marginal qualifications.
Some testers visited lenders as couples, posing as husband and wife inquiring together,
while others conducted one-person visits, but indicated that they were married.
Based on the pre-test experience, the project’s pilot phase conducted
approximately 250 paired tests of a representative sample of mortgage lending
institutions in Los Angeles, California and Chicago, Illinois.6  These tests followed a
single, standardized set of protocols in order to yield statistically rigorous measures of
adverse treatment against African Americans and Hispanics in the two metropolitan
housing markets.  Specifically, testers posing as first-time homebuyers visited mortgage
lending institutions to make a general, uninformed request for information about how
much house they could afford and what loan products might be available to them.
All of the testers were assigned financial profiles that qualified them for products
targeted to borrowers with A- credit in their respective housing markets.  Specifically,
their assigned income and asset levels were sufficient to purchase a median-priced
house in their metropolitan area, assuming a 30-year conventional fixed-rate loan at 8
percent interest with a 5 percent downpayment.  The financial profiles made the testers
moderately asset-constrained, meaning that their available downpayment resources
limited the loan amount for which they could qualify.  In addition, all of the testers were
assigned one or two minor credit blemishes, usually a late payment of some kind.   The
                                                
5 In principle, paired testing might be used to measure discrimination at the application and
underwriting stage of the mortgage lending process as well.  However, most experts believe that federal
laws prohibiting the submission of false credit applications make it impossible to extend the paired testing
methodology into the application stage.  For further discussion of this issue, see Turner and Skidmore
(1999).
6 Lessons from the pre-test phase were also incorporated into a package of tools for enforcement
testing.   See Freiberg and Herbig(2002).
two members of each tester pair were given virtually identical financial and household
characteristics, with the minority partner always slightly better qualified than the white.
In both Chicago and Los Angeles, testers visited a representative sample
mortgage lending institutions in the metropolitan area that reported under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),7 accepted at least 90 mortgage loan applications per
year, and had offices in the region that a first-time homebuyer could realistically find and
visit.  In order to draw a market representative sample, lenders were selected with
replacement, with the probability of selection based on loan volume.  Lending institutions
with very large application volumes not only had a high probability of selection, but were
likely to appear in the sample more than once.  This sampling strategy allows us to draw
conclusions about the incidence of differential treatment by large lending institutions in
Chicago and Los Angeles that are directly accessible to first-time homebuyers.8
In the Los Angeles metropolitan area, 35 lenders were selected for black/white
testing and 34 were selected for Hispanic/Anglo testing see (Exhibit 1).   In each
categories, the lenders selected accounted for half of the application activity captured in
HMDA data.  In Chicago, the lenders selected for black/white testing covered 47 percent
of the application activity, while those tested for treatment of Hispanics and Anglos
covered 51 percent.
Exhibit 1: Final Sample of Lending Institutions
# of Institutions Application Volume % of HMDA Activity
Lenders Tested LA Chicago LA Chicago LA Chicago
Black/White 35 49 81,031 78,655 50 47*
Hispanic/Anglo 34 51 80,447 85,214 50 51*
* During the course of testing, one institution in our sample merged with another large lender.
HMDA application volume for this lender is difficult to determine and is not represented in
these totals.
While the sample was drawn based on lending institution, each test was
conducted by visiting an individual branch office, which was randomly selected from all
of the institution’s local offices.  To select a branch office for a test, a list of the target
lender’s local branches was compiled.  Urban institute staff made calls to local offices to
verify addresses and determine which branches potential borrowers could visit to receive
information on mortgage loans.9  Once the list of local branches was reduced to those
                                                
7 HMDA requires all independent mortgage companies and mortgage lenders owned by depository
institutions that make at least 100 home purchase and/or refinancing loans in a given year to report on the
demographic and locational characteristics of all applications and loans.
8 Levels and patterns of discrimination may be different for smaller lending institutions or when
inquiries are made by telephone or internet rather than in person.
9 Information on the volume of activity conducted by each branch was not available.
providing mortgage information, the branch to be tested was selected randomly from the
list.
The testing protocols that testers were followed when conducting a test can be
summarized in five basic steps.
• Step #1 - Obtain an Appointment.  All testers called to arrange “in person”
visits with lenders.  Testers were provided detailed instructions on how to
complete such calls and how to avoid protracted conversations with loan
officers over the phone.
• Step #2 - Make the Initial Request.  When testers arrived for their
appointments, their first step was to very clearly state (up to three times, if
necessary) that the purpose of their visit was to obtain help in figuring out a
price range of housing that they might be able to afford and an estimated
loan amount for which they might qualify.
• Step #3 - Exchange Personal/Financial Information.  Testers were trained to
be forthcoming and provide income, debts, assets, credit information and
other personal and financial characteristics when requested by a lender.
Testers were instructed to be precise when providing their financial
information and refer to their “cheat sheets” if necessary.  Under no
circumstances, however, did testers provide a social security number or date
of birth or authorize a credit check.
• Step #4 - Record Information on Financing Options Recommended.  Testers
were required to take notes and record information provided by the lender
such as suggested home price range, an estimated loan amount, and details
about any financing options recommended.
• Step #5 - End the Visit.  Testers were instructed to thank the lender for any
assistance and allow the lender to suggest any follow-up contact.
Following every test visit, testers were completed a Test Report Form and a Test
Narrative Form.  The Test Report Form recorded their responses to specific questions
about the test experience and the information that was provided by the lender.  The Test
Narrative Form provided a detailed, chronological, account of the test experience in the
tester’s own words.  Additional narrative forms were completed by testers following any
phone contact by a lender.  Testers were instructed to complete all forms as soon as
possible following contact with a lender.  Testers completed the forms based on their
recollection of what occurred during the test, and on their review of notes taken and
materials obtained during the test.10
                                                
10 Because of the complexity of lender testing, the detailed narratives played a particularly
important role in quality control.  Specifically, test coordinators, quality control supervisors, and Urban
Data from paired testing can be used to construct three different types of
measures:  1) measures of the gross incidence of differential treatment; 2) measures of
the net incidence of differential treatment; and 3) measures of the severity of differential
treatment.  Each of these measures is briefly explained in turn.
A gross incidence measure is defined as the share of all tests in which the
minority receives less favorable treatment than his or her white Anglo partner.  Gross
incidence measures provide very simple and understandable indicators of how often
minorities are treated less favorably than equally qualified white Anglos.  However, there
are also cases in which minority testers receive better treatment than their white Anglo
partners.  Thus, we constructed measures of the gross incidence of minority-favored
treatment as well as measures of the gross incidence of white-favored treatment.
Net incidence measures focus on the difference between these two gross
incidence measures by subtracting the gross incidence of minority-favored treatment
from the gross incidence of white-favored treatment for a given indicator.
A large net incidence measure would suggest that―even though minorities are
sometimes favored over white Anglos―unfavorable treatment of minorities is
substantially more prevalent.  A small net incidence measure, on the other hand,
suggests that while lenders do not always provide comparable treatment to similar
customers, they are just as likely to treat minority customers favorably as white Anglo
customers.
Net incidence measures are often interpreted as estimates of systematic
discrimination against minorities.  If one assumes that white Anglos rarely experience
systematic adverse treatment, then all cases of minority-favored treatment can be
interpreted as random differences in treatment, unrelated to race or ethnicity.  If this
assumption is correct, then by subtracting cases of minority-favored treatment from the
cases of white-favored treatment, the net incidence measure removes the element of
random error and reflects the true incidence of discrimination against minorities.
However, if the assumption is incorrect (and systematic discrimination against white
Anglos does sometimes occur), then the net measure may actually understates the
incidence of discrimination against minorities.11
In the analysis presented here, gross incidence measures are reported for both
white-favored and minority-favored treatment.  When these two gross measures are
                                                                                                                                              
Institute staff all reviewed the narrative reports to ensure that testers adhered to HTP protocols and
accurately completed the more structured, closed-ended Test Report Form.
11 For a more extensive discussion of the interpretation of gross and net measures, see Turner et al
(2002).
significantly different from one another (the net measure is significantly greater than
zero), then we conclude that a systematic pattern of differential treatment based on race
or ethnicity has occurred.  If, on the other hand, the incidence of minority-favored
treatment is essentially the same as the incidence of white-favored treatment, we cannot
conclude that these differences are systematically based on race or ethnicity.  Because
our sample sizes are relatively small, and the data may not be normally distributed,
conventional tests of statistical significance may fail to detect differences in treatment
that are actually significant.  Therefore, we used the Sign Test to determine whether the
incidence of white-favored treatment was significantly different than the incidence of
minority-favored treatment.12
It is important to note that even when no statistical pattern of race-based
differential treatment is observed, individual cases of discrimination may have occurred.
Specifically, for variables where the gross measures of white-favored and minority-
favored treatment is essentially equal, there may in fact be instances of race-based
discrimination, even though the overall pattern does not systematically favor one group.
Finally, even when treatment in one area appears to favor either the white Anglo or the
minority tester, this does not necessarily mean that the entire test favors that tester.  A
qualitative review of the entire test file might be needed to assess the overall outcome
across multiple measures.
Gross and net incidence measures are complemented by measures of the
severity of differential treatment, which reflect the size or magnitude of differences in
treatment between minority testers and their white Anglo partners.13  Severity measures
can only be constructed for forms of treatment that yield continuous differences, such as
dollars of loan amount or number of loan products.  These measures do not apply to
simpler “yes/no” forms of treatment, such as whether a customer receives any
information or whether a customer is told she is qualified for any loan products.  Again
because of our small sample sizes and the potential that the data are not normally
distributed, we employed the more sensitive Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test  to measure the
statistical significance of these severity measures.14
Unequal Information and Assistance for Minority Homebyers
Even at the pre-application stage, inquiries about mortgage products and terms
are complicated interactions and differences in treatment can take many forms.  Based
                                                
12 See Heckman and Siegelman(1993) and Ramsey and Schafer (1997).
13 Note that severity measures are inherently net measures, since they reflect the average of
differences between minority and white outcomes.  Thus, cases where are minorities were favored
effectively cancel out cases where whites were favored.
14 See Ramsey and Schafer (1997)..
upon the testing protocols and procedures described above, we explored six major
questions about the information and assistance that lending institutions provided:15
1) Did testers receive the information they requested about loan amounts
and house prices they could afford?
2) How much were testers told they could afford to borrow and/or buy?
3) How many specific products were testers told about?
4) How much “coaching” did testers receive to help them qualify for a loan?
5) Did testers receive follow-up calls from lenders?
6) Were testers encouraged to consider FHA loans as an option?
In each of these areas, the experience of the white Anglo and minority members
of a tester pair were compared to determine whether both were treated equally, the
white Anglo tester was favored, or the minority tester was favored.  We then calculated
the incidence of differential treatment across tests, to reflect the frequency with which
equally qualified partners were treated differently from one another when they visited
lending institutions to inquire about mortgage products.  In addition, for some forms of
treatment (such as maximum loan amount), we calculated the severity of differential
treatment, by comparing the average amount quoted to white Anglo testers to the
average amount quoted to minority testers.
Did testers receive the information they requested?  When testers visited
mortgage lending institutions, they posed as first-time homebuyers trying to obtain basic
information about how much they might be able to borrow and how much house they
can realistically afford.  Thus, the first group of treatment measures focuses on whether
white Anglo and minority testers were equally successful in getting the basic information
they requested.  Exhibit 2 reports the incidence of differential treatment for four
indicators in this category:
• Was a loan amount provided?
• Was a house price provided?
• Were specific financing options discussed?
                                                
15 Testers also recorded the terms and conditions of specific loan product they were offered.
Ideally, one would want to compare terms and conditions for comparable loan products offered to both white
and minority customers.  However, because HTP protocols called for testers to approach lending institutions
with a very general request for information, the product-specific information they received was very diverse.
Similar products were listed in different order and given different names, and testers did not always receive
a complete set of terms and conditions for every product discussed.  Therefore, it is not possible to match
products and compare terms and conditions.  Annex C presents an exploratory analysis that simply
compares average terms and conditions across the specific loan products discussed with testers.
• Were financial details exchanged (in other words, did the loan officer provide
information about loan amount and/or house price after finding out about the
tester’s financial circumstances)?
In addition, we constructed a summary score for this group of treatment indicators,
reflecting both the amount and quality of information testers received.  This summary
score encompasses all four of the individual indicators that make up this category.  It
ranks and scores the indicators to create an overall measure of the level of information
received.  Scores were assigned to each tester as follows:
Summary
Score Treatment
5 Financial details were exchanged and the tester received a loanamount or house price and specific financing options were discussed
4 Financial details were exchanged and the tester received a loanamount or house price but no specific options were discussed
3 Financial details were not exchanged but the tester received a loanamount or house price and specific financing options were discussed
2 Financial details were not exchanged and the tester received a loanamount or house price but no specific options were discussed
1
The tester did not receive a loan amount or house price
Then, for each test, scores were compared for the two testers to determine whether one
was favored overall.  The tester with the higher summary score was considered favored
in this area.  This ranking scheme reflects the view that homebuyers are best served
when loan officers provide information about affordable house prices and loan amounts
that are based on knowledge of the customer’s financial circumstances.
Exhibit 2: Who Received the Information Requested?
Black/white tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
% White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
Loan amount provided 6.8 4.1 0.73 6.3 1.3 0.22
House price provided 6.8 6.8 1.00 5.1 3.8 1.00
Specific options discussed 6.8 5.5 1.00 6.3 0.0    0.06 *
Financial details exchanged 13.7 11.0 0.81 17.7 8.9 0.19
Overall info provided 9.5 8.1 1.00 8.9 5.1 0.55
Hispanic/Anglo Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators %
Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
% Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
Loan amount provided 11.4 1.3 0.02** 5.1 3.8 1.00
House price provided 10.1 1.3 0.04** 6.4 6.4 1.00
Specific options discussed 11.5 1.3 0.02** 5.7 8.6 0.75
Financial details exchanged 17.7 10.1 0.29 10.1 13.9 0.65
Overall info provided 12.7 1.3 0.01** 7.5 8.8 1.00
*     difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 90%
confidence level or higher
**   difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level or higher
Testers received the same treatment most of the time on black/white tests in both
Los Angeles and Chicago.  The incidence of both white-favored and minority-favored
treatment was almost always below 10 percent, with slightly higher incidences only in
the financial details exchanged category.  For most indicators, there were no statistically
significant differences between the incidence of white-favored treatment and the
incidence of minority-favored treatment.  The only statistically significant difference was
found on specific financing options.  In 6.3 percent of black/white tests in Chicago, the
lender discussed specific financing options with the white tester but not the black tester
in a pair.  Black testers were never favored on this treatment variable.
For Hispanic/Anglo tests, testers
also received the same treatment most of
the time, but Anglo testers were favored
overall in Los Angeles.  Results for the
Hispanic/Anglo tests were similar to
black/white tests in that testers received
the same treatment most of the time.
However, in Los Angeles, when
differences did occur, they were
significantly more likely to favor Anglos
than Hispanics.  Specifically, the
incidence of Anglo-favored treatment for
loan amount provided, house price
provided, and specific financing options discussed was about 10 to 12 percent, while the
incidence of Hispanic-favored treatment on these indicators was only about 1 percent.
For the overall information summary score, Anglos were favored 12.7 of the time in Los
Angeles, while Hispanics were favored only 1.3 percent of the time.  In Chicago, on the
Although a white male tester declined to authorize a
credit check, the loan officer pre-qualified him for a
maximum loan amount of $200,000.  Four days later,
the same loan officer met with a Hispanic male tester
and refused to provide any information or service.
The loan officer told the Hispanic tester, “we usually
don’t meet with anyone without doing the credit
check, it would be a waste of time for you and for me”
and added “you can go to other lenders, they might
be able to help you without first pulling out your credit
as every mortgage corporation has a different policy.”
When the tester pressed one more time to obtain an
estimate, the loan officer stated, “I’m sorry, but I can’t
answer your questions without first pulling your
credit.”
other hand, the Hispanic/Anglo results were comparable to the black/white results
discussed earlier, with no significant pattern of differential treatment favoring either
Hispanics or Anglos.
How much were testers told they could afford?  Testers asked loan officers
for help in figuring out a price range for their housing search and loan amounts for which
they would be qualified.  Because the minority and white Anglo members of each tester
team were so closely matched with respect to their financial characteristics, they should
have received comparable estimates from the lending institutions they visited.  If minority
homebuyers do not receive estimates of affordable loan amounts and house prices that
are comparable to those provided to white Anglo homebuyers, their housing search may
be discouraged or misdirected.  They may conclude that they cannot afford the kind of
house they want, or they may limit their search to lower-priced neighborhoods than they
could in fact afford.  The next group of treatment indicators focuses on the maximum
loan amounts and house prices that testers were told they could afford.  This analysis is
limited to tests in which both testers were able to exchange accurate financial
information and obtain either a loan amount or a house price from the loan officer.16
The two members of a tester pair were often quoted different house prices or
loan amounts, but in general these differences did not systematically favor either white
Anglos or minorities.17  Exhibit 3 reports the share of cases in which one tester was
quoted a higher loan amount or house price than his or her partner.  For black/white
tests in both Los Angeles and Chicago, and for Hispanic/Anglo tests in Los Angeles no
statistically significant patterns of either white-favored or minority-favored treatment
occurred.
                                                
16 Results are the same when all tests in which both testers received a loan amount or house price
are included in the analysis, regardless of whether or not financial information was exchanged.
17 Although minority and white tester financial characteristics were closely matched, testing
protocols did call for the minority tester to be slightly more qualified that his or her white partner.  The
incidence indicators used for loan amount and house price analysis incorporate a 5 percent threshold to
account for the slight variations in qualifications.  More specifically, one tester in a pair was considered to be
favored over the other if the house price or loan amount he was quoted exceeded his partner’s by at least 5
percent.
Exhibit 3: Who Was Quoted A Higher Loan Amount or House Price?
Black/white tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
% White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
Maximum loan amount 32.6 26.1 0.70 26.9 17.3 0.40
Maximum house price 36.2 27.7 0.58 25.5 21.6 0.84
Average Amounts White Black SignificanceTest White Black
Significance
Test
Maximum loan amount $262,438 $266,484 0.92 $182,730 $183,122 0.28
Maximum house price $285,783 $291,186 0.89 $193,824 $193,312 0.56
Hispanic/Anglo Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
% Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
Maximum loan amount 42.9 32.7 0.51 51.9 19.2 0.01**
Maximum house price 44.0 30.0 0.32 51.0 13.7 0.00**
Average Amounts Anglo Hispanic SignificanceTest Anglo Hispanic
Significance
Test
Maximum loan amount $271,570 $266,172 0.34 $190,193 $180,301 0.00**
Maximum house price $283,846 $284,737 0.64 $199,932 $188,055 0.00**
*    difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 90%
confidence level or higher
**   difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level or higher
However, for Hispanic/Anglo tests
in Chicago, Hispanics testers were
systematically disfavored on loan amounts
and house prices.  Anglo testers were
quoted higher loan amounts or house
prices than their Hispanic partners about
50 percent of the time, while Hispanics
were favored less than 20 percent of the
time.  In addition to this significant
incidence finding, the severity, or magnitude of loan amount and house price differences
was also statistically significant.  The average loan amount quoted to Anglo testers in
Chicago was $190,200.  This amount was almost $10,000 higher than the average of
A loan officer pre-qualified a white male tester for a
home price of $185,000 and a maximum loan amount
of $175,750. The loan officer also provided the white
tester with a “Pre-Qualification Certificate.”  Eight
days later, the same loan officer met with an African
American male tester and pre-qualified him for a
home price of $165-175,000 and a maximum loan
amount of $160,000.  The loan officer did not provide
the African American tester with a “Pre-qualification
Certificate.”
$180,300 quoted to their Hispanic partners.  The average house price suggested to
Anglo testers―about $200,000―was $12,000 higher than the average suggested to
comparable Hispanic homebuyers―$188,000.
How many loan products were testers told about?  In addition to loan
amounts and house prices, testers inquired about specific loan products that might meet
their needs, including products recommended by the loan officer.  Therefore, we
compared the experience of minority and white Anglo testers in terms of the number of
loan products described.  Homebuyers presumably benefit when they are able to obtain
information about a variety of financing options.  If minorities receive less complete
information about available loan products than comparable white Anglo homeseekers,
they may have to spend more time and effort to find out about available products, or they
may actually be unable to take advantage of beneficial products.
In many cases, white Anglo testers learned about more products than their
minority partners.  (See Exhibit 4).  In the Chicago black/white tests, lenders discussed
more products with white testers than their black partners 48.2 percent of the time, while
blacks were favored in only 21.4 percent
of tests.  Overall, whites learned about an
average of 2.95 products per visit while
blacks learned about only 2.43 products.
The same pattern occurred for
Hispanic/Anglo tests in both Los Angeles
and Chicago.  In Los Angeles, although the incidence of differential treatment was not
statistically significant, the magnitude measure shows that Anglos were told about an
average of 2.92 products when Hispanic testers were told about only 2.33 (this
difference is statistically significant).  In Chicago, both the incidence and severity
measures were statistically significant for the Hispanic/Anglo tests.  Anglos were told
about more products than their Hispanic partners 55.6 percent of the time, while
Hispanics were only favored in 27.8 percent of tests.  Moreover, Anglos learned about
an average of 2.83 products per visit, compared to only 2.44 products per visit for
Hispanics.
A loan officer told a white male tester about five
possible loan options, including both conventional
and FHA products.  Eight days later, the same loan
officer only discussed one loan option (an FHA
product) with the Hispanic tester.
Exhibit 4: Who Learned About More Products?
Black/white tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
% White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
Number of products 38.8 32.7 0.74 48.2 21.4 0.02**
Average Amounts White Black SignificanceTest White Black
Significance
Test
Number of products 1.2.53 2.41 0.44 2.95 2.43 0.01**
Hispanic/Anglo Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
% Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
Number of products 51.9 34.6 0.23 55.6 27.8 0.04**
Average Amounts Anglo Hispanic SignificanceTest Anglo Hispanic
Significance
Test
Number of products 2.92 2.33 0.03** 2.83 2.44 0.05*
*    difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 90%
confidence level or higher
**   difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level or higher
How much “coaching” did testers receive?  One of the important services
loan officers provide at the pre-application stage is “coaching”―advice and assistance to
potential homebuyers about how they can improve their qualifications as borrowers.  If
minority customers receive less coaching than comparable white Anglos, they may lack
the information they need to correct problems that might prevent them from obtaining
mortgage financing.  Thus, coaching represents a subtle but potentially important form of
differential treatment in the mortgage lending process at the pre-application stage.
In the Homeownership Testing Project, testers reported whether loan officers
provided advice or guidance about any of the following:
• paying down debts;
• debt consolidation;
• downpayment assistance (e.g., gift from family, special program, etc.);
• seller assistance (e.g., paying points, downpayment, closing costs, etc.);
• pre-qualification or pre-approval letter; or
• homebuying seminar.
All of these information items would help potential borrowers improve their prospects for
obtaining a mortgage loan. We compared the number of these items that were
discussed with each of the two members of a tester pair; Exhibit 5 presents the results of
this analysis.
Whites received more coaching
than their minority partners in a
statistically significant share of the
black/white tests in both Los Angeles and
Chicago.  In both markets, whites were
favored over half the time, while their
minority partners were favored less than
one fourth of the time.  In Los Angeles,
white testers received advice about 1.42
topics per visit compared to only 0.8
topics per visit for their black partners.  In Chicago, white testers received advice about
1.54 topics per visit compared to only 1.06 topics per visit for blacks.
The same pattern of unequal coaching occurred for Hispanic/Anglo tests in
Chicago, where Anglos were favored in 41.3 percent of the tests while their Hispanic
partners were favored in only 23.8 percent of tests.  On average, Anglos received
information about 0.99 topics per visit compared to only 0.64 topics per visit for
Hispanics.  There was no statistically significant pattern of unequal coaching for
Hispanic/Anglo tests in Los Angeles.
Exhibit 5: Who Received More Coaching?
Black/White Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
% White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
Positive Coaching 43.2 18.9 0.01** 50.6 29.1 0.03**
Average Amounts White Black SignificanceTest White Black
Significance
Test
Positive Coaching 1.84 1.3 0.01** 1.74 1.53 0.33
A loan officer informed a white male tester about the
possibility of having the seller pay the closing costs
and referred the tester to a real estate agent.  In
making the referral, the agent stated  “Let me give
you someone’s card.  He’s a good guy.  You’ll get
along with him, I know.  He’s your age” and added
that “he’ll know what you are looking for.”  The same
loan officer did not inform the African American male
tester about the possibility of a seller paying closing
costs and did not refer the tester to a real estate
agent.
Hispanic/Anglo Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
% Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
Positive Coaching 39.2 36.7 0.80 40.5 15.2 0.01*
Average Amounts Anglo Hispanic SignificanceTest Anglo Hispanic
Significance
Test
Positive Coaching 1.67 1.60 1.00 1.25 1.14 1.00
*     difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 90%
confidence level or higher
**   difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level or higher
Did testers receive follow-up contact?  After the pre-application visit ended,
some testers received follow-up telephone calls or mail from loan officers.  These
contacts may serve an important marketing and educational function, providing
additional information to potential homebuyers, encouraging them to continue the
homebuying process, and letting them know that they are valued customers.  If
minorities receive less follow-up of this kind from lending institutions they visit, they may
become discouraged about their housing search or may take longer to find suitable
mortgage financing.  Follow-up contacts to testers were systematically recorded, and we
compared the number of contacts received by the white Anglo and minority members of
each tester pair (see Exhibit 6).18
Exhibit 6: Who Received More Follow-Up?
Black/White Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
% White
Favored
% Black
Favored
Significance
Test
Follow-Up Contact 5.4 5.4 1.00 12.7 1.3 0.01**
Average Amounts White Black SignificanceTest White Black
Significance
Test
Follow-Up Contact 0.11 0.05 0.67 0.22 0.03 0.01**
                                                
18 Mail and telephone follow-up were given equal weight, with each piece of mail or telephone call
counted as one follow-up contact.
Hispanic/Anglo Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
% Anglo
Favored
%
Hispanic
Favored
Significance
Test
Follow-Up Contact 6.3 13.9 0.21 7.6 13.9 0.33
Average Amounts Anglo Hispanic SignificanceTest Anglo Hispanic
Significance
Test
Follow-Up Contact 0.19 0.38 0.06* 0.16 0.28 0.21
*    difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 90%
confidence level or higher
**  difference between % Anglo favored and % Hispanic favored is statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level or higher
Only the black/white tests in Chicago show a statistically significant pattern of
unequal follow-up.  In all three other tracks of tests (black/white in Los Angeles and
Hispanic/Anglo in both Los Angeles and
Chicago), differential treatment was
commonplace, but it did not
systematically favor either white Anglos
or minorities.  The Chicago results are
quite dramatic, however.  White testers
received more follow-up than their black
partners in 12.7 percent of the tests, compared to only 1.3 percent of tests in which the
black testers were favored.  On average, whites in Chicago received 0.22 follow-up calls
per visit to a lending institution, while blacks received only 0.03 follow-up calls per visit.
In Los Angeles, although the incidence of differential treatment was not statistically
significant, the magnitude measure suggests that Hispanics received more follow-up
than their Anglo partners.  Specifically, Hispanics received an average of 0.38 follow-up
contacts per visit compared to an average of only 0.19 for Anglos (this difference is
statistically significant).
Were testers encouraged to consider FHA?  One type of product that lenders
may suggest to prospective homebuyers is an FHA loan.  Because FHA guidelines are
relatively flexible, they serve some borrowers who do not meet conventional underwriting
standards.  However, FHA loans can cost more than conventional loans over the long
term and may also permit lenders to charge higher fees.  Moreover, in Los Angeles, the
testers’ financial characteristics qualified them for a conventional loan above the FHA
maximum, so that recommending FHA might unnecessarily constrain their search
options.
After meeting with a white and a black tester, the
loan officer asked both for their addresses. The white
tester received follow-up contact in the form of a
business card and a brochure about an additional
financing option to consider.  The black tester
received no follow-up mail or telephone calls.
We constructed two variables that reflect the information provided by lenders
about FHA.  The first indicates whether testers were encouraged to consider FHA, and
includes cases in which an FHA loan was among the specific products described to the
tester as well as cases in which the loan officer recommended FHA.  The second
variable indicates whether FHA was explicitly discouraged, and includes cases in which
the loan officer told testers that FHA would not be a good option for them to consider.
Exhibit 7 reports the share of tests in which FHA was either encouraged or discouraged.
Black testers in Los Angeles were substantially more likely to be encouraged to
consider FHA than their white partners.  Specifically, FHA was encouraged for black
testers but not their white partners in 30.8 percent of tests, while FHA was encouraged
to whites but not blacks in only 7.7 percent of tests.  None of the results in the remaining
groups of tests (black/white in Chicago and Hispanic/Anglo in Los Angeles and Chicago)
provide evidence of systematic differences in treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity.
In general, white Anglos and minorities received the same encouragement or
discouragement, and when differences occurred they did not favor either white Anglos or
minorities at statistically significant levels.
Exhibit 7: Who Was Encouraged to Consider FHA?
Black/White Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % White
Higher
% Black
Higher
Significance
Test
% White
Higher
% Black
Higher
Significance
Test
FHA encouraged 7.7 30.8 0.10* 9.8 14.6 0.75
FHA discouraged 7.7 3.8 0.63 12.2 4.9 0.45
Hispanic/Anglo Tests
Los Angeles Chicago
Treatment Indicators % Anglo
Higher
%
Hispanic
Higher
Significance
Test
% Anglo
Higher
%
Hispanic
Higher
Significance
Test
FHA encouraged 15.0 30.0 0.51 13.0 13.0 1.00
FHA discouraged 0.0 0.0 — 2.2 2.2 1.00
*    difference between % Anglo higher and % Hispanic higher is statistically significant at a 90% confidence
level or higher
**   difference between % Anglo higher and % Hispanic higher is statistically significant at a 95% confidence
level or higher
Sensitivity Analysis.  For all of the treatment indicators reported above,
additional analysis stratified the tests by three potentially important factors: whether both
testers in the pair met with the same or different loan officers, whether the lender was a
prime or sub-prime institution, and whether testers met with a minority agent.  Because
of the small sample sizes, these stratified analyses were based on pooled data from
both Los Angeles and Chicago.
Although not mandated by the testing protocols, in approximately half of all tests
both testers in a pair happened to meet with the same loan officer.  In the other half of
tests, testers met with different loan officers from the same branch of the same
institution.  The question of whether testers saw the same loan officer is particularly
important because it is often used by lending institutions to explain away observed
differences in treatment.  When tests were stratified by whether testers saw the same
loan officer or different loan officers, the patterns of differential treatment remained
essentially the same.  There was no evidence that statistically significant differences in
treatment were more prevalent when the two testers saw different loan officers.
Tests were also stratified based on whether the lending institution had been
identified by HUD as a sub-prime lender.  Although our sampling protocols did not
mandate the inclusion of sub-prime institutions, they were tested to the extent that they
were represented among HMDA-reporters in our two sites.  Tests at sub-prime
institutions made up 10.5 percent of all tests conducted in Los Angeles, and only 5
percent of tests completed in Chicago.  Only 7.7 percent of all tests in the sample as a
whole were conducted at sub-prime lending institutions.  Since statistical analyses on
such a small number of tests are not reliable, a true stratification analysis based on sub-
prime/prime lenders could not be conducted.  However, when sub-prime tests were
excluded from the analysis, patterns of differential treatment were essentially the same
for all treatment indicators. 19  Therefore, there was no evidence from this testing effort
that sub-prime lenders were either more or less likely to treat minorities unfavorably at
the pre-application stage.
Finally, we explored differences in test results based upon the race or ethnicity of
the loan officer.  In about 30 percent of all tests, testers met with a minority loan officer.
One hypothesis is that minority loan officers may treat minority customers more
favorably than white Anglos.  In fact, we found that white-favored treatment occurred
somewhat more frequently when the loan officer was a white Anglo than when the loan
officer was minority.  But there was no increase in minority-favored treatment when the
loan officer was minority.
                                                
19 To identify subprime lenders, we used HUD’s 1999 list of sub-prime lenders.  More information
about this list, and a copy of the list itself (table A.1) can be found at:
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html .
Implications for Future Research and Enforcement Testing
Based upon the results of this pilot testing effort, we conclude that paired testing
at the pre-application stage of the mortgage lending process is both feasible and
effective for both enforcement and research purposes.  The results demonstrate
convincingly that unequal treatment of minority homebuyers at the pre-application stage
of the mortgage lending process remains a significant problem.  Additional testing clearly
should be conducted.   But because of the complexity of this kind of testing and the
differences between metro area results, we do not recommend a large-scale national
study of adverse treatment at the pre-application stage of the mortgage lending process.
Instead, systematic studies should be conducted on a site-by-site basis, with ample time
and resources for effective training, test coordination, and quality control.
The testing protocols implemented for this study focused on only one source on
pre-application information, one set of borrower profiles, and one type of pre-application
inquiry.  They do not tell us how often adverse treatment occurs for other types of
borrowers, making different types of pre-application inquiries to other information
providers.  Therefore, future testing efforts can and should focus on other information
sources, including mortgage brokers, new home sales agents, mobile home dealers, and
referrals from real estate agents.  They should include testers posing as less well-
qualified borrowers as well as homebuyers with a particular house price in mind.  And
they should employ different protocols, including scenarios in which testers approach
lending institutions with a specific house price in mind, and request detailed information
about available loan products.
Some of the tests conducted for
this pilot evidence provided anecdotal
evidence that lenders may encourage or
discourage customers from considering
particular neighborhoods.  This may
include comments that steer minority
customers away from predominantly
white areas or  that discourage whites
from investing in minority
neighborhoods.  However, our testing
protocols were not designed to systematically elicit or record comments of this kind or to
analyze the characteristics of communities discussed by loan officers.  Future testing
efforts should consider strategies for systematically capturing and analyzing this type of
differential treatment.
Finally, our experience demonstrates that research and enforcement testing can
be linked without compromising the integrity of either.  It is important to distinguish
testing for research from testing conducted primarily for law enforcement purposes.
A loan officer informed a white female tester that
Monterey Park is “Asian-infested” and that homes
quickly sell to relatives of existing Asian residents.
The loan officer told the white tester that she could
consider homes in Pasadena, Glendale, Silverlake
and the San Gabriel Valley and that she might want
to consider Alhambra because it has easy access to
the freeway and she could “live quietly in a safe
neighborhood.”  The African American tester received
no comments or suggestions about specific
neighborhoods.
Testing for research generally seeks to produce generalizable results regarding the
prevalence of adverse treatment for a market area or for the nation as a whole.  To
achieve these generalizable results, tests are randomized using an accepted sampling
frame, and quite large numbers of tests are conducted in order to support statistically
significant comparisons.  To generate reliable and objective comparisons of minority and
white experiences across a large number of tests, researchers usually use highly
structured reporting forms, with closed-ended, “check the box”-type items.
By contrast, the purpose of an enforcement test is to establish legal violations
and to correct them either through settlement or litigation.  Testing for enforcement is
often complaint driven, and typically is targeted to a single firm or a selected set of firms.
Enforcement testing often requires multiple tests of a single firm, but generally does not
involve the large number of tests typical of research testing.  As a consequence,
enforcement testing report forms tend to be much more open-ended, requiring test
partners to provide greater narrative detail, rather than check boxes.  These forms are
generally analyzed pair-by-pair by a knowledgeable analyst who compares the treatment
of test partners across all aspects of the encounter, including subjective as well as
objective information.
Although research and enforcement testing differ in significant ways, the
distinctions between the two should not be overdrawn.  Both are based on the same
core methodology and protocols, differing primarily in the way test results are recorded
and analyzed.  Thus, innovative testing methodologies developed for one application
can be adapted for the other.  Moreover, randomized testing of large numbers of market
transactions need not be limited to research.  They can and should be applied in
targeting for enforcement.  Furthermore, research and enforcement testing can be
conducted in tandem, yielding both market-wide estimates of the incidence of adverse
treatment and case-specific evidence of individual violations (evidence that might be
followed-up with enforcement oriented testing).
Conclusion
Rigorously designed and implemented paired testing demonstrates that in both
Los Angeles and Chicago, African American and Hispanic homebuyers face a significant
risk of receiving less favorable treatment than comparable whites when they visit
mortgage lending institutions to inquire about financing options.  In the majority of cases,
minorities and whites received equal treatment, or when differences occurred, they were
equally likely to favor the minority as the white.20  But in both metropolitan areas, paired
                                                
20 It is important to recognize that even when we do not observe a statistically significant pattern of
systematically unequal treatment, discrimination may have occurred in individual cases.  For some treatment
variables, differences in treatment occurred quite frequently but favored minorities just as often as whites.
testing revealed statistically significant patterns of unequal treatment that systematically
favored whites.21
Unequal treatment took different forms in the two metropolitan areas and for the
two minority groups.  In Los Angeles –
• Blacks were offered less coaching than comparable white homebuyers, and
were more likely to be encouraged to consider an FHA loan.
• Hispanics were denied basic information about loan amount and house price,
told about fewer products, and received less follow-up  compared to Anglo
homebuyers.
In Chicago –
• Blacks were denied basic
information about loan amount and
house price, told about fewer
products, offered less coaching, and
received less follow-up than
comparable white homebuyers.
• Hispanics were quoted lower loan
amounts or house prices, told about
fewer products, and offered less
coaching than comparable Anglo
homebuyers.
These patterns of unequal treatment occurred
regardless of whether the two members of a
tester pair met with the same loan officer or with
different loan officers.
The frequency of unfavorable treatment
varied considerably from one category to
another.  For some categories, equal treatment
occurred in the vast majority of cases, but when
differences occurred, the white tester was dramatically more likely to be favored than his
or her minority partner.  For other treatment categories, differences in treatment
                                                                                                                                              
These differences may result from random variations in the behavior of loan officers, but they may also
include cases of discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity.
21 Results are reported as statistically significant when the difference between the rate of
white/Anglo-favored treatment and the rate of minority-favored treatment is significant at a 90 percent
confidence level or higher.
Two female testers, one white and one black, visited
the same Los Angeles area lender two days apart
and met with the same loan officer.  The testers told
the loan officer that they were first-time homebuyers
and needed assistance in figuring out a home price
range and a loan amount for which they might
qualify.  The loan officer requested and obtained
detailed information on household income, debts,
and assets from both testers and asked about their
respective credit situations.  He then estimated that
the white tester would qualify for a $332,500 loan to
purchase a $350,000 home and, but estimated that
the black tester would qualify for a $237,500 loan to
purchase a $245,000 home.  The loan officer told the
white tester that a seller would likely pay some of the
closing costs, but no mention was made about seller
assistance to the black tester.  The loan officer also
told the white tester that it was a good idea to have a
home inspection conducted prior to purchase, while
the loan officer did not mention anything about the
value of a home inspection to the black tester.  The
loan officer provided a complete loan application
package to the white tester, but not to the black
tester.
occurred much more often, but again were substantially more likely to favor the white
than the minority tester.  The series of charts below illustrate the levels of unfavorable
treatment for each treatment category where statistically significant differences were
observed.
Despite the variations in the forms that differential treatment takes, these findings
demonstrate that African American and Hispanic homebuyers in both Los Angeles and
Chicago face a significant risk of unequal treatment when they visit main-stream
mortgage lending institutions to make pre-application inquiries.  Discriminatory treatment
at this early stage in the mortgage lending process has the potential to discourage some
minorities from continuing their housing search, to limit their search to lower cost homes
than they could actually afford, or to put them at a disadvantage in the loan application
and underwriting process by failing to inform them about the most favorable loan
products or about ways to improve their creditworthiness.
References
Carr, James H. and Isaac F. Megbolugbe. 1993. “The Federal Researve Bank of Boston
Study on Mortgage Lending Revisited.” Journal of Housing Research 4(2):277-
314.
Fix, Michael and Margery Austin Turner.,eds. 1999. A National Report Card on
Discrimination in America: The Role of Testing. Washington, D.C.: The Urban
Institute.
Freiberg, Fred and Carla Herbig. 2002.  Guide to Enforcement Tools for Fair Lending
Testing. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute
Goering, John M. and Ron Wienk, eds. 1996. Mortgage Lending, Racial Discrimination,
and Federal Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Heckman, James J. and Peter Siegelman. 1993. “The Urban Institute Audit Studies:
Their Methods and Findings” in Clear and Convincing Evidence: Testing for
Discrimination in America (Fix, Michael, and Raymond J. Struyk eds.).
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
Ladd, Helen. 1998. “Evidence on Discrimination in Credit Markets.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 12(Spring):41-62.
Munnell, Alicia, et al. 1986. “Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HAD Data.”
American Economic Review 86(March): 25-53.
Ramsey, Fred L. and Daniel W. Schafer. 1997. The Statistical Sleuth: A Course in
Methods of Data Analysis. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Ross, Stephen and John Yinger. 2002.  The Color of Credit: Mortgage Discrimination,
Research Methodology, and Fair-Lending Enforcement.  Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
Turner, Margery A., Stephen Ross, George Galster, and John Yinger. 2002.
Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing Markets: Results from Phase I of
HDS2000. Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development:..
Turner, Margery A. and Felicity Skidmore, eds. 1999.  Mortgage Lending Discrimination:
A Review of Existing Evidence.  Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute .
Yezer, Anthony M. ed. 1995. Fair Lending Analysis: A Compendium of Essays on the
Use Of Statistics. Washington, D.C: American Bankers Association..
